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Abstract
Encountering the increasing demand for high-performance computational resources in academic as well as commercial organisations, utility computing offers
a solution by providing users with on-demand availability of requested computing
services. Approaches to the fundamental issue of resource allocation include the
use of technical scheduling mechanisms as well as introducing economic ideas
into the allocation schemes. Technical scheduling mechanisms are often very simple (such as first-in-first-out) but suffer under the shortcoming to adequately prioritize jobs in times when demand exceeds supply. As empirical studies show,
Grids (such as PlanetLab) are frequently characterized by huge excess demand
for resources. This is where economic models such as markets come into play.
Hitherto, market mechanisms are either (too) simple or too complex for usage in
Grids.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. Firstly, a mechanism for Grids is proposed, which is still simple but geared up for use in the Grid. Secondly the
mechanism is embedded in state-of-the-art Grid middleware Sun N1 Grid Engine
6. Thirdly, it is shown by means of a numerical case study that this mechanism is
superior to other commonly used mechanisms.
Keywords: Utility Computing, Grid Computing, Market-based Scheduling,
Pay-as-Bid, Sun N1 Grid Engine

1 Introduction
The number of complex and elaborate calculations which require increasingly
powerful and faster computing resources has been constantly growing. At the
same time, resource owners intend to keep their resource inventory at a minimum
level to avoid high total cost of ownership. A promising solution to these diverg-
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ing trends is to pool together distributed, computational resources to large clusters, so called “Grids”, that can provide users with sufficient computing resources
on-demand (Foster et al. 2001). Grid computing is often denoted as utility computing, as computing resource are utilities like water or electricity and can be accessed dynamically (Rappa 2004). Recently, mainly two utility computing initiatives have made waves in the community: Sun’s One-Dollar-Per-CPU-Hour1 and
Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud2 are prominent examples for the industry takeup of utility computing offerings.
Concerning their size and build-up, Grid systems can be classified into three
types: Cluster Grids are sets of cooperating computer hosts in a cluster that offer a
single point of access to users within a project or department. Enterprise or Campus Grids enable the sharing of computer resources for members of different projects or departments within an organisation. Global Grids realize the Enterprise
Grid idea across organisational boundaries and therefore allow for the creation of
large virtual resource sharing systems (Joseph et al. 2004).
The key problem in distributed resource sharing environments, be it Cluster, Enterprise or Global Grids, is allocation, i.e. how to distribute the scarce resources to
requesters at what time. The common approach to this problem is to use technical
schedulers (such as first-in-first-out) to determine the allocation. Those technical
schedulers are hampered by the fact that they cannot define reasonable priorities
in cases when there is excess demand for resources (Stößer et al. 2007).
In recent years, the idea of employing market based mechanisms attracted more
and more interest due their ability to base the allocation on the real demand and
supply situation (Smidt 1968; Sutherland 1968). As a side effect, sophisticated
pricing models are facilitated.
In this paper, we will focus on Enterprise Grids and in particular on Sun N1 Grid
Engine (N1GE). The results we achieve here, whether the market mechanism can
be used for N1GE as well, can be generalized to other Enterprise Grids. The reason why we refer to N1GE is to assure that our market solution is not just purely
theoretical but solidly founded in the real world. N1GE is a distributed resource
management and scheduling system from Sun Microsystems which operates on
the Enterprise Grid level (N1GE User’s Guide, 2005). Being an extension of the
Solaris operating system, it administers and dynamically allocates the shared pool
of heterogeneous resources such as computing power, memory and licensed software within an organisation. The usage of these resources is managed in a way to
best achieve the goals of the organisation, such as productivity, timeliness and
level of service. Concerning the IT infrastructure itself, a more efficient utilisation
provides the basis for the reduction of total cost of ownership and the increase of
return on assets for the organisation’s computing facilities. N1GE has been employed for setting up Grids within organisations like companies and universities,
each comprising a cluster size of around 500-2,000 CPUs.
N1GE provides means of submitting requests for execution of computationally
demanding tasks, so called “jobs”, to the users associated with the system. A
technical scheduler orchestrates the allocation of jobs to the available shared resources by arranging the jobs in a central queue, using a variation of configurable
1
2

http://www.sun.com/service/sungrid/overview.jsp, February 13, 2007
http://www.amazon.com/gp/browse.html?node=201590011, February 13, 2007
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policies. These policies represent the prevailing precedence structure among single users, departments and projects within the organisation and thus conduce to
the appropriate entitlement in the competition for computational resources. Administrators of N1GE are provided with tools for policy adaptation as well as system monitoring, controlling and reporting.
This paper is novel and unique as it proposes a mechanism for Grids which is
fairly simple but specifically designed for usage in the Grid. The proposed
mechanism is embedded in state-of-the-art Grid middleware Sun N1 Grid Engine
6. Furthermore, we show in a numerical case study that this mechanism is superior to other commonly used mechanisms.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a motivational scenario which shows how the market mechanism can be integrated in the
current scheduler of N1GE. Section 3 covers related efforts in developing marketbased market mechanisms for scheduling in the Grid. Section 4 introduces the
base model of allocation algorithms. Section 5 presents an extension to this base
model which tailors the mechanism to the Grid. A numerical case study is given
in section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper with a brief summary and gives an
outlook for future research opportunities.

2 Motivational Scenario
The N1GE scheduler consists of a waiting queue with pending jobs and a technical scheduler that assigns waiting jobs to idle resources (see figure 1). The user
submits a job combined with a specification of requirements of the job. There are
two different groups of specifications, namely hard and soft state. Hard state requirements are essential for a job to run. If no resource fits the required specifications, the job will be ignored by the scheduler and remains pending. Soft state
requirements are tried to be considered, but the job’s processing does not depend
on them. If no further specification is given by the user, a job is assigned to a random resource which fits the requirements. If the job’s requirements cannot be accomplished by the assigned resource, e.g. the memory size does not suffice, the
job fails and the user is notified. In the N1GE scenario, a system administrator is
usually responsible for submitting the resource specification. End users do not
need to care about the resource requirements of their jobs.
After receiving the job requests, the scheduler places the jobs on the waiting list of
pending jobs. The position of a job in the waiting list is determined by the job’s
priority value. This priority value is calculated by the scheduler using a predefined mix of different policies. There is one global waiting list under a centralized administration for all pending jobs in the Grid environment.
An excerpt of different policies is given next (Chaubal 2005):
•

Entitlement policy (Ticket Policy, Share Based): Fair share (resp.
proportional share) with manually (by the administrator) set shares for
individual users, user groups, a department or a project.

•

Urgency policy: Policy with deadline contribution (increase of dispatch
priority for jobs which will reach their deadline soon), wait-time
contribution (increase of dispatch priority for jobs that have been waiting
for a long time) and resource requirement contribution (change of dispatch
priority for jobs based on the resources they requested).
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•

Custom policy (POSIX): Standard users can sort their jobs according to
their importance by assigning different priority values. These ratings apply
only to the user’s own jobs.

•

Override policy: The administrator can manually intervene and modify the
dispatch priorities.

Figure 1: Scheduling in the Sun N1 Grid Engine 6

An example policy mix can look like this
P mix = We * N e + Wu * N u + Wc * N c
where Pmix is the dispatch priority, N e is the normalized entitlement priority (on
an interval between 0 and 1) and We is the entitlement weighting factor. N u , Wu ,
N c and Wc are defined accordingly for the urgency and custom priorities.
The dispatch priority for each pending job is reevaluated periodically. The time
interval for this reevaluation is defined by the system administrator. The job
length is not taken into account for the scheduling. Once a job is allocated, it can
use the resource until it is finished. This leads to a possibility of manipulation. A
user can submit a job with e.g. an endless loop in order to block resources. In this
case the administrator can stop the job manually or a limit of maximum processing time can be defined. If a job exceeds this limit it is automatically terminated.
Market mechanism can be attached to the system by incorporating them as a new
policy to the priority values. The administrator defines weights for the rules of the
market mechanism in the policy mix and can hence influence the impact the new
policy has on the dispatch priorities. Introducing a market-based mechanism to the
Grid Engine scheduler allows users to directly influence their dispatch priority by
submitting bids along with their jobs. To be useful for N1GE, the market mechanism must meet the following requirements (Stößer et al. 2007, cf. Table 1).
Requirement
Allocative
efficiency
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Scope
Economic

Description
Allocative efficiency is the overall goal of market mechanisms for Grid resource allocation. A
mechanism is allocative efficient, if it maximizes
the utility across all participating users (welfare
or overall “happiness”).
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Budget-balance

Economic

A mechanism is budget-balanced if it does not
need to be subsidized by outside payments.

Computational
tractability

Functional

The market mechanism needs to be computed in
polynomial run time in the size of the number of
resource requests and offers.

Online
Mechanism

Functional

The allocation of the mechanism needs to be
made instantaneously, as the market assumes the
role of operating system schedulers.

Simplicity

Functional

The mechanism needs to be simple such that the
participants understand the mechanism and the
bidding strategy.

Table 1: Requirements for the market mechanism

3 Related Work
There are two other basic groups of allocation schemes dealt with in Grid-related
literature which aim at distributing fractions of a resource among requesters: fair
share and proportional share mechanisms.
•

Fair share mechanism
Fair share mechanisms belong to the group of technical schedulers. One
example is the SHARE scheduler proposed by Kay and Lauder (1988).
Opposed to other technical schedulers, the idea behind fair share is to be
fair to users rather than to processes. It is a scheduling strategy in which
the usage of a certain resource (mainly CPU time) is equally distributed
among system users (as opposed to equal distribution among processes). In
a group of n users, everyone will receive a fraction of 1 n of the available
resource. Different fair share implementations allow the administrator to
partition users into groups and apply fair share to these groups as well. The
most common way of implementing the fair share scheduling strategy is to
recursively apply the round-robin scheduling strategy. The drawback of
the fair share strategy is that all parameters are pre-specified and set by the
system administrator. The users have no influence on the allocation. From
an economic perspective, the fair share strategy reaches only a very low
level of allocative efficiency; except in the case that all users have the
same utility for a share of the resource. On the downside, fair share is a
simple, online, budget-balanced mechanism.

•

Proportional share
To alleviate the problems encountered with fair share and to increase efficiency, proportional share mechanisms were introduced. Proportional
share initially allows for resource distribution with shares of unequal size
for different users accounting for varying importance among them.
Whereas scheduling according to pre-set, fixed shares for different users
remains technical, market-based proportional share mechanisms dynamically base the resource share on the users’ reported valuations, their
“bids”. The total amount of available resources is distributed among the
requesters according to the fraction their reported valuation amounts to in
the sum of reported valuation across all resource requesters: a user i with
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reported valuation vi will receive a fraction of vi

∑

n
j =1

v j of the available

resource when a group of n users is competing for resource access. Systems using proportional share as allocation scheme were proposed by
Chun and Culler (2000), Stoica, Abdel-Wahab et al. (1996) and Lai et al.
(2004). Chun and Culler (2000) employ the idea of proportional share on a
market where multiple requesters compete for computing time. The system
aims at optimizing for user value and utilizes a scheduler which assures
that each requester receives a share of the resource which corresponds to
the fraction of its reported valuation for the resource. The problem with
market-based proportional share is that it does generally not support Quality of Service assertions. The mechanism holds the risk that requesters are
not able to obtain the necessary resources (Lai et al. 2004); the share of resources provided to a requester, i.e. the actual service level returned to the
requester, will generally be below or above this requester’s required service level. More importantly, the basic form of market-based proportional
share as suggested by Chun and Culler (2000) does not support advance
reservation and may result in high latency which is fatal for interactive applications (Lai et al. 2004). For their Tycoon system, Lai et al. (2004)
tackle latency problems and incorporate advanced reservation for resources and an incentivising payment scheme in the basic market-based
proportional share mechanism. In summary, proportional share mechanisms satisfy all requirements except the most important one, allocative efficiency.
In the following we will explore an alternative mechanism – a so-called pay-asbid mechanism (Sanghavi and Hajek 2004) – that may improve on these present
mechanisms.

4 Basic Model
Let τ be an allocation mechanism that splits up one unit of a perfectly divisible
good among n users. The vector w = [ w1 ,..., wn ] comprehends the non-negative
bids of the users. These bids equal the payments the users have to make for the
share of the resource that is assigned to them. This share is referred to by
x = [ x1 ,..., xn ] and is calculated according to the pre-specified τ . Thus xi = τ i ( w)
is the quantity user i is allocated as a result, given a payment vector w .
The allocation mechanism τ is considered valid if it satisfies the following four
properties (Sanghavi and Hajek 2004):
1. It is an allocation: τ i ≥ 0 and

∑w
i

i

∑τ ( w) = 1
i i

for all values of w such that

> 0 ; a zero bid will always get zero allocation.

2. It is smooth: τ i ( wi , w−i ) is differentiable, increasing and concave in wi for
all w−i .
3. It is symmetric in the user indices, such that τ i ( w) = τ σ (i ) (σ ( w)) for all
permutations σ of the indices i = 1,..., n .
4. It is scale free, such that τ i (γw) = τ i ( w) for all real γ > 0 and 0 ≤ i ≤ n .
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Given this problem formulation, Sanghavi and Hajek (2004) propose an allocation
mechanism τ which is shown to be optimal for two users. The two users, referred
to as l (“low bidding”) and h (“high bidding”), have a payment vector ( wl , wh )
with wl ≤ wh . The optimal mechanism τ * , guaranteeing the best worst case
fractional efficiency3 and can be devised as follows:

τ l* ( wl , wh ) =

wl
2 wh

τ h* ( wl , wh ) = 1 −

and

wl
2 wh

It can be shown that a Nash Equilibrium exists for any scenario with valid user
utility functions and a valid allocation mechanism τ, i.e. it satisfies the properties
given in chapter 2. A utility function is considered valid if it is differentiable, concave and strictly increasing. The Nash equilibrium point can be regarded as the
result of a hypothetical repeated game where users give “myopic best responses”:
bids are continuously adjusted based on the market information generated by previous iterations and finally converge to the values which constitute the equilibrium (Sanghavi and Hajek 2004).
Compared to any other valid mechanism, the basic model generates at least an
equally high social welfare in its Nash Equilibrium point. Furthermore, the
uniqueness of this Nash Equilibrium can be guaranteed. Hence, the mechanism is
not only optimal for the worst case, but even for any pair of valid value functions.
For two buyers, the worst case fractional efficiency of τ * adds up to 87 %. The
mechanism ends up in this worst case scenario when both buyers have linear value
functions4.
This difference in the levels of efficiency is caused by the different pricing
schemes. While proportional share uses homogeneous pricing, Sanghavi and Hajek (2004) introduce a discriminatory pricing mechanism. The buyer with a lower
bid pays a higher price per share than the high bidder. This volume discount encourages high bidders to bid higher, and thus closer to their true valuation, compared to a scenario with a uniform pricing scheme where users can potentially
benefit from shading their bids downwards.
amount _ paid
In general, the pricing is given by pi ( w) = quantity
_ received . This equals the price the
user would be paying for the entire unit given his bid. Thus, for the Sanghavi/Hajek mechanism, in the two buyer case the following pricing scheme is applied:
2 wh2
pl ( w) =2 wh and
with pl ≥ ph .
p h ( w) =
2 wh − wl
Sanghavi and Hajek (2004) developed an extension of the above mechanism from
two to n buyers. This mechanism still has the property of a “volume discount”,
i.e. higher bidders pay lower prices.

3

The fractional efficiency is defined as

∑ U ( x ) , with U ( x
∑
∑ U (x )
i

i

i

i

i

*
i

i

i

*
i

) ≥ ∑i U i ( xi ) ∀x

4

In addition, the slope of the value function of one buyer has to be half the slope of the other
buyer. As a comparison the worst case efficiency of the proportional share mechanism is 82.84%
(for a proof see Johari and Tsitsiklis 2004).
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For n buyers and a given payment vector w = ( w1 ,..., wn ) , the following mechanism is proposed:
1
wj
wi
*
τi =
(
1
−
s
)ds
∏
wmax ∫0 j ≠i
wmax
with at least two wi ≥ 0 and wmax being the maximum bid.
Since it satisfies the four previously given requirements, the mechanism τ * is
valid. The given mechanism simplifies to the optimal mechanism proposed for
two buyers when n is set to 2.
In contrast to the case for two buyers, it is hard to determine an exact value for the
worst case efficiency for an unlimited number of buyers. Instead, Sanghavi and
Hajek calculate an interval as an approximation for the worst case efficiency:
~ ))
U (τ * ( w
∑
i
i i
≤ 0.875
0.8703 ≤
*
∑i U i ( xi )
Obviously, the proposed mechanism is still close to the theoretical maximum
worst case efficiency, i.e. 87.5%. But a guarantee that the mechanism τ * is the
optimal one can no longer be given.

5 Extended Model
To adapt the basic model to the domain of scheduling in a Grid environment, with
a particular focus on the N1GE scenario, further considerations have to be done.
The following section presents a number of extensions to the basic model which
are required to make the scheduling mechanism applicable for large-scale resource clusters retaining the economic features:
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•

Re-evaluation of the Priority Value
Recalculation of the priority values of all pending jobs is necessary whenever a new job enters the waiting list. This is required since every new bid
would change the allocated share of each waiting job. The re-evaluation of
all jobs would put quite some load on the scheduler if a large number of
jobs enter the waiting queue within a short time interval. This problem can
be prevented if the recalculation is not done for every new job, but according to a pre-specified time window. All jobs arriving at the waiting queue
during such a window are gathered and the recalculation is done for all of
the jobs at once. A problem that could arise when time windows are employed is that jobs arriving at the beginning of such a window are delayed
before being put on the waiting queue. This is especially undesirable for
time critical and urgent jobs. Therefore the time window has to be specified accordingly (e.g. re-evaluation is done every 2 seconds) to minimize
the delay of the jobs.

•

Feedback
For a convergence to the Nash equilibrium point, the users need feedback
on their bids to see how much share of the good they received. Using this
partial market information, they will adjust their bids in myopic best responses to finally reach the Nash equilibrium point. The N1GE scheduler
does not support direct feedback yet. The reporting tool for the waiting list,
named qstat in N1GE, shows the priority value for each job, but this is the
accumulated value for all policies that are part of the policy mix in the
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specific scenario. To ensure a convergence to the Nash equilibrium it
might be necessary to extend the tool in such a way that it reports the fraction of the priority value that was allocated to each job according to the
submitted bid. The “won” priority value should only be reported to the
user that submitted the respective job. Otherwise it might exhibit the possibility for a user to draw conclusions on the other users’ valuations and
consequently influence his future bids in such a way that the Nash equilibrium is no longer reached.
•

Bid Updating
Related to the issues of re-evaluation of the priority value and feedback is
bid updating: Shall the mechanism allow bidders to update their bids after
submitting the jobs to the waiting queue? Considering a periodic reevaluation of the priority value, this would not increase the computational
effort since priorities are updated anyway. It still needs to be analysed if
bid updating has any impacts on the economic properties of the mechanism. But it probably would not change these properties since bid updating
can be interpreted as part of the “myopic best response” bidding which
leads to the Nash equilibrium. It would allow bidders to directly react on
the positioning of their jobs in the queue.

•

Job Starvation
The current Sanghavi/Hajek mechanism entails the problem of job starvation. If a user submits a job with a very low bid the job will be displaced
by all following jobs with a higher bid. Thus this job will probably never
proceed to be executed. To diminish this setback a waiting time bonus
could be introduced. This instrument is already incorporated in the N1GE
urgency policy and allows increasing the priority value of a job according
to the time it has already waited. Another possibility would be a deadline
for pending jobs. After a certain specified time of waiting in the queue the
job will be “killed” and taken out of the queue. The user who submitted
the job will be informed. This solution can be combined with the possibility for users to update their bids. Should the previous bids not suffice for
the job to advance in the queue, the user can increase the bid value. If this
is not done, the job will eventually be dismissed by the system.

•

Job Length
The current disregard of the job length when calculating the priority values
is another topic to be discussed. Currently the job length is not taken into
account at all for determination of the job’s order in the queue. Consequently, the mechanism is not “merge-proof” (Moulin 2004): It might be
unattractive for users to submit short jobs with high urgency. These kinds
of jobs are very expensive compared to longer jobs. Hence users might
tend to merge smaller jobs to one big job to pay the “entrance fee” to the
waiting list only once. Submitting a merged job with a bid that equals the
sum of the single bids of the merged bids could lead to a much better position in the waiting queue compared to submission of the single jobs. It
might thus be useful to base the allocation on the lengths of jobs, which
however creates the need for determining a job’s length beforehand.
Though there are tools for roughly estimating the duration of a specific
job, incorporating them will doubtless have a negative effect on the ease of
use of the mechanism.
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•

Payment
It has to be specified at what time of the allocation process the user has to
make his payment. It might happen that the job is rejected because none of
the machines fits the job’s required specifications or that it fails during
execution. If the user has to pay directly after submitting his job to the
waiting list, he has to be refunded in these cases where the execution of the
job fails. A payment that is made in the first stage of allocation is also
problematic when bid updating is allowed. For every modified bid that he
submits he has to adjust his payment. A solution would be to account only
for jobs which passed the execution phase successfully.

6 Case Study
In the following case study, fair share, proportional share and the extended model
are compared concerning their allocation and the resulting efficiencies. They are
assumed as being incorporated as policies in the N1GE scheduler and the only
policies to determine the dispatch priority; all other available policies are
weighted with 0.
Suppose two users are competing for resources in this N1GE environment. Currently all resources are blocked with running jobs. The waiting list for pending
jobs is empty. Now the two users submit their jobs J i , with i = 1,2 , along with the
resource specifications required for the job’s execution. For the proportional share
and the Sanghavi/Hajek pay-as-bid mechanism each user additionally submits his
bid wi .

6.1.
Allocation and Pricing
The scheduler computes the priority values according to the pre-specified scheduling mechanism, here: fair share, proportional share and extended mechanism. The
share for each user is denoted by xi . The users’ quasi-linear utility functions are
given by U 1 ( x) = 1.5 x1 − p1 x1 and U 2 ( x) = 4 x 2 − p 2 x 2 where pi is user ith unit
price, i.e. the price user i would have to pay if he got the whole resource unit. Furthermore, assume the centralized resource provider to have a quasi-linear utility
function U P ( x) = ∑i pi xi with no reservation prices. This is a quite realistic assumption in Enterprise and Campus Grid settings. Consequently, social welfare
can be computed as U ( x) = U 1 ( x) + U 2 ( x) + U P ( x) = 1.5 xi + 4 xi .

Fair Share
Applying the fair share scheduling strategy, in which each user receives an equal
share and no payments arise from this allocation, the priority value for all users
can be calculated as xi = 1n . In the current example with two users, x1 and x2 are
consequently set to 0.5 and p1 = p2 = 0 . This allocation results in the valuations
U1 ( x) = 0.75 , U 2 ( x) = 2 and U P ( x) = 0 . Summing up the individual valuations,
the fair share mechanism creates welfare of U ( x) = 2.75 , which corresponds to an
efficiency ratio of 68.75% compared to the optimal allocation; In this optimal allocation, the high bidding user is given a priority value of 1.0 whereas the low
bidder receives nothing. This allocation would create the maximum social welfare
of 4.
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Proportional Share
The example applies a dynamic type of proportional share mechanism in which
the users submit bids to the provider. After receiving the bids, the provider distributes fractions of the priority value according to the pre-set allocation rule
w
τ~i ( w) = i to the users.
∑i wi
Concerning the pricing, it is assumed that a pay-as-bid rule is applied: Each user is
required to finally pay a total sum which equals his submitted bid. For the pay-asbid-rule, the unit price pi for user i can consequently be computed as
w
wi
wi = pi xi ⇔ pi = i . With proportional share, however, xi =
and thus
xi
∑j wj
pi = ∑ j w j , that is user 1 and user 2 have to pay the same unit price.

For two users, the given utility and pricing functions, the mechanism arrives at the
Nash equilibrium5 bid vector w* = ( w1* , w2* ) =(0.2975, 0.7934). In this Nash equilibrium, x * = τ~ ( w* ) = 3 is allocated to user 1 and x * = τ~ ( w* ) = 8 to user 2 and
1

1

2

11

2

11

*
i

no user i has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from its bid w . The unit prices
are p1* = p 2* = 1.1 .
Thus the proportional share mechanism generates an overall social welfare of
U ( x) = 1.5 ⋅ 113 + 4 ⋅ 118 = 3.32 and an efficiency ratio of 82.95%.

Extended Model
According to the optimal allocation mechanism τ * for the two users given above,
the Nash equilibrium point is reached for the bid vector ( w1* , w2* ) = (0.28125,
0.75) and the following shares are allocated to the users:
w*
x1* = τ 1 ( w* ) = 1 * = 0.1875
User 1:
2 w2
w1*
= 0.8125
2 w2*
In the Nash equilibrium, the extended model results in an overall social welfare of
U ( x) = 1.5 ⋅ 0.1875 + 4 ⋅ 0.8125 = 3.53125 . Hence, the allocation according to the
extended model reaches an efficiency ratio of 88.28% for this setting, which is
significantly higher than the results of the fair share and proportional share allocations.

User 2:

x 2* = τ 2 ( w* ) = 1 −

Applying the pay-as-bid-rule to this allocation exemplifies the “volume discount”
w
for the high bidding user 2. He pays a unit price of p 2* = *2 = 0.9231 whereas
x2
w
user 1 has to pay a notably higher unit price of p1* = *1 = 1.5 .
x1

5

For a derivation and proof of uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for the proportional share
mechanism see Maheswaran and Basar (2005).
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Fair Share

Proportional Share

Extended Model

Bid vector

---

( w1* , w2* ) = (0.30,0.79)

(w1* , w2* ) = (0.28,0.75)

Allocation

x1 = x2 = 0.5

x *1 = 0.27

x1* = 0.19

x *2 = 0.73

x 2* = 0.81

Unit prices

---

p1* = p2* = 1.09

U 1 ( x * ) = 0.11

U1 (x* ) = 0

Utilities

U 1 ( x) = 0.75
U 2 ( x) = 2
U P ( x) = 0

U 2 ( x * ) = 2.12

U 2 ( x* ) = 2.5

U P ( x ) = 1.09

U P ( x* ) = 1.03

Social Welfare

U ( x) = 2.75

U ( x * ) = 3.32

U ( x * ) = 3.53

Efficiency ratio

68.75%

82.95%

88.28%

*

p1* = 1.5

p 2* = 0.92

Table 2: Comparison of the Scheduling Mechanisms

7 Conclusion
The extended model being inspired by Sanghavi/Hajek pay-as-bid mechanism is a
promising addition for the N1GE scheduler. Employing a market-based mechanism for resource allocation in Grids offers new possibilities on both sides, for
providers as well as for buyers. Current technical schedulers require an administrator to specify user weights based on these users’ relative importance, regardless
of the dynamic demand and supply situation, opening up possible inefficiencies.
To this end, the Sanghavi/Hajek pay-as-bid mechanism allows flexible reactions
to changes in the demand and supply situation. Moreover, it offers an elaborated
pricing scheme where prices reflect the current market situation and induce users
to report their true valuations to the system. The administrator no longer needs to
adjust the weights manually and the users can directly express urgency of their
jobs by submitting a high bid without being dependent on the administrator as a
“mediator”. Furthermore, this usage-based pricing scheme opens up new avenues
for both external (Inter-enterprise and Utility Computing) Grids and internal (Enterprise and Campus) Grids.
The implementation of the mechanism within N1GE can be done fairly easy as a
new scheduling policy, which then would be part of the policy mix. This integration can be done without major changes in the existing architecture. As mentioned, an extension of the current waiting list reporting tool might be necessary to
enable a more sophisticated feedback functionality for the users. Very important
for a successful integration of a market-based scheduler will be the enforcement
of the payment. Thus some kind of payment system, either based on real money or
virtual credits, has to be integrated in the N1GE architecture which is conjunct
with a high implementation effort.
Comparing the extended model to other market-based mechanisms, it scores with
its ease-of-use and an allocation mechanism that is transparent to the user. In addition, it has a noticeably increased worst case fractional efficiency in comparison to
the proportional share mechanisms and is close to the theoretical maximum regarding the worst case efficiency of pay-as-bid mechanisms. Above all, the extended model imposes a very low additional communicational and computational
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effort on the scheduling process. It allows real-time allocations, even if the recalculation of the priority has to be done periodically.
Further work has to be done on analyzing the extensions and their impact on the
economic features of the mechanism. For this purpose it would be very helpful to
actually implement the mechanism within the N1GE scheduler. This would allow
for running simulations to examine the mechanism’s behaviour and performance,
especially regarding execution time, in large scale clusters.
In addition, the focus is on other scenarios where the mechanism can be employed
along with the N1GE. A very interesting and challenging approach is to establish
a decentralized version of the mechanism to support decentralized waiting queues
as well. This might be necessary to keep the N1GE scheduler applicable for very
large clusters (20,000+ cores), which will be demanded in the near future.
A second scenario would change the current allocation per job to a reservation of
timeslots of whole machines (resp. CPUs). This would enable users to book a machine for a certain time span and use it to run as many jobs as possible. The problem with this scenario is a restriction of N1GE, which allows only one task per
CPU at a time. A possible solution to this would be virtualization, where virtual
machines are utilized on a layer between scheduler and resources to make single
CPUs “divisible”.
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